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Local truces in the Syrian conflict, what the regime called 
reconciliation (muslaha) agreements and the great powers 
later termed de-escalation or deconfliction zones have varied, 
over time, largely according to the changing balance of 
power. They ranged from compromises in which after a cease 
fire opposition fighters remained involved in security and 
governance roles in their areas, to cases of virtual opposition 
surrender involving evacuations of fighters or even whole 
populations.  
 
The Context Shaping “Reconciliation:” the Changing 
Balance of Power The Syrian government and opposition 
forces had, from quite early on, negotiated truces in limited 
areas, but greater impetus was given to this by the growing 
incapacity of either side to win the war. The regime, facing 
manpower shortages that precluded the re-conquest of 
opposition areas, took the lead in trying, instead, to impose 
settlements piece by piece on the arenas on the margins of 
government controlled areas where opposition 
concentrations were most threatening. The truces reflected 
and formalized the reality of a war of attrition, in which 
advances were incremental and difficult to hold, tending to 
fragment control. Also, the failure of national level “top-
down” political negotiations, notably Geneva II, led the third 
UN mediator, Stephan DeMistura to propose in November 
2014 less ambitious bottom up local truces in order to reduce 
the violence and in the hope these would acquire momentum 
enabling the national level negotiations stalemate to be 
overcome (Beals 2017).  
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 The shifting balance of power tended to determine the 
pace and kind of agreement. In the Damascus area, the 
regime benefited from the opposition’s fragmentation, 
inability to coordinate combined offensives and vulnerability 
to being picked off one by one. Populations became alienated 
as opposition fighters failed to shield people from the 
regime’s sieges and air assaults as well as by their infighting 
over control of supplies and access points, personal power 
and doctrinal differences (among Islamists) (Glass 2017; 
Lund, 2017b). Another factor was the co-optation of 
opposition FSA forces by Jordan and Turkey, to secure their 
borders and fight IS and the PYD rather than Asad. Most 
notably, the Russian intervention, the fall of Aleppo and 
Turkey’s realignment with Russia, giving up on the goal of 
overthrowing Asad, set up a certain bandwagoning toward 
the apparently winning regime side (Samaha 2017).  
 When surveyed as to why the opposition was 
accepting deals with the regime, respondents cited relief from 
sieges, bringing security, declining prospects of military 
victory over the regime and an opportunity to re-coup arms. 
(Turkmani and Kaldor 2014). After years of unrest, 
massacres and deadlocks, public opinion seemed to shift in 
favour of the security and safety that the regime could 
possibly better deliver (Lakitsch 2017). 
 After its 2015 intervention, Russia’s strategy started 
to dominate the settlement process. Moscow proposed “de-
escalation/de-confliction zones” to contain the conflict. The 
medium-term goal would be something resembling post-civil 
war Bosnia, with government and opposition forces 
responsible for security in their own areas (Memorandum; 
Applying Bosnia Model). In the shorter term, getting the 
moderate fighters to accept de-escalation would in practice 
bring them to accept the Asad regime and, at times, allow 
them to be used against the jihadists. At the Astana meeting, 
13 armed factions, having suffered battlefield losses, 
especially in Aleppo and loss of backing from Turkey, were 
brought, albeit unwillingly, into the negotiations over what 
became the Astana agreement, (AP 2017). It specified four 
de-escalation zones-- northern Homs, Ghouta, south 
Daraa/Quneitra and Idlib and parts of neighbouring 
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provinces. Not only would fighting stop in these areas, but 
the government was obliged to allow humanitarian aid, 
restore public services and allow refugees to return; also 
having little choice, Damascus said that although it would 
abide by the agreement, it would continue fighting 
“terrorism” –a label it applies to all armed rebel groups. 
Opposition militants recognized the agreement aimed to split 
the FSA from the jihadists, thus divide the opposition to 
Asad’s benefit. Russia, Turkey and Iran were to provide 
forces to police the ceasefire, although agreement over the 
details was not reached. The Putin-Trump pact — detailed in 
a Memorandum of Principle for De-escalation in Southern 
Syria — was to establish a similar cease-fire between Syrian 
government forces and armed opposition in southern Syria 
that would maintain the existing division of control between 
the two sides, though, unlike Astana, it did not recognize any 
role for Iran, directly or indirectly (i.e. Hizbullah), in 
securing this agreement.  
 In essence, the military opposition has come to terms 
with the fact that it had to separate from the jihadist groups 
and come to terms with a heavy Russian role and presence 
because the alternative was Iran, and that changing the Asad 
regime was, at the very least, no longer achievable in the 
short run. The ‘deconfliction zones’ constituted the only 
tangible ‘achievement’ the opposition could claim on the 
ground, since they were in theory areas which were not 
completely under government control, and yet under some 
form of international protection. Because these zones were 
only clearly defined in terms of the areas they cover, rather 
than in actual nature, both the regime and the opposition 
would inevitably attempt to impose their respective modes of 
governance and security.  
 
Regime Discourse 
The Syrian government professed to follow a policy of 
dialogue regarding political reform with all domestic parties 
“which rejected foreign interference and violence, “while 
combating foreign-backed” insurgencies. Following the 
failed Geneva II conference in which it claims the “foreign – 
backed opposition” excluded itself from the reform process, 
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internal dialogue was asserted to be the only viable peaceful 
exit from the conflict. (SANA 2014; nsnbc international, 
2014) 
 National reconciliation was a “strategic vision” 
articulated by President Bashar al-Asad (al-Baath 
Newspaper). The government established a Ministry of 
National Reconciliation in 2012 under Ali Haidar who 
claimed successful conclusion of 50 reconciliation projects 
as of September 30, 2015 (Stone 2016). The strategy was to 
separate the foreign fighters from Syrian fighters and the 
“terrorists” from moderate fighters who could be “brought to 
their senses” (Adleh and Favier 2017). He presented a benign 
representation of the process: the ministry selected 
influential local people to form a committee of reconciliation 
which contacted the fighters and offered safe passage out of 
the area for those fighters who refused reconciliation and 
amnesty for those who laid down their arms. The latter were 
invited to join the army and many, the regime claimed, did 
so. President Asad granted blanket amnesties eight times in 
the last five years for a total of about 20,000 former Syrian 
“mercenaries.” In July 2016, Asad issued Legislative Decree 
No. 15, the legal basis for ‘reconciliation,’ which included 
amnesty for those who ‘turn themselves in and lay down their 
weapons.’ (Ezzi, 2017). Opposition supporters were 
guaranteed the right to work with the (unarmed) Syrian 
internal opposition. The Syrian media conveyed the view that 
the people in opposition controlled areas wanted (SANA, Oct 
2015) to embrace national reconciliation, but were afraid of 
violent reprisal from terrorist organizations. Reconciliation 
would boost trust between citizens and officials, settle the 
legal status of youths who decided to lay down their 
weapons, address the issue of missing people, and enable 
humanitarian aid. “Reconciliations are doing very well now,” 
said President Asad’s adviser, Dr. Bouthaina Shaaban in 
2017. “And there are many areas in the pipeline. We feel that 
this is the best way to end the war.” (Glass 2017)  
 How does the regime see the cumulative outcome of 
reconciliation? Legislative Decree 107, on administrative de-
centralization, has been said to provide a potential framework 
for a post-conflict devolution of political authority that would  
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allow all sides of the conflict to retain some degree of control 
over the areas under their jurisdiction; yet, it also grants wide 
powers and to a presidential appointed governor at the 
province level (Aarabi 2017). Giving the present alternatives, 
that may well be an ideal outcome allowing at least some 
power-sharing. 
 
Regime Strategy 
However, People’s Assembly speaker Hadiyah Abbas gave a 
more realistic assessment in describing reconciliation as a 
way “to enhance the victories achieved by the Syrian Arab 
Army against the terrorist organizations.” (SANA, Sept 
2016). Indeed, sources close to the regime see reconciliation 
as part of a sophisticated regime survival strategy. This 
strategy combines negotiations with the opposition, with the 
unrestrained use of force, (relying on Russia for diplomatic 
protection at the UNSC against international reaction) 
reflecting the regime view that one can never negotiate from 
weakness. However, faced with manpower constraints, 
rather than risk significant regime causalities, the regime 
came to pursue a policy of siege and waiting until the villages 
or towns were finally ready to capitulate (which the older 
notables would pressure the fighters to accept.). The state 
security system, armed with intelligence files amassed over 
generations, knew its enemies and their vulnerabilities. 
Discovering that no tactic worked everywhere, the regime’s 
negotiators offered different kinds of deals in different areas; 
for example, those that demonstrated high resistance in 
fighting the regime faced total population removal and safe 
passage to rebel controlled areas (i.e. the Idlib governorate) 
(Glass 2017). Many deals concentrated on the peripheries of 
Damascus where the regime gradually expanded against 
rebel concentrations that were a threat to its nerve centre, but 
also in Homs, Aleppo and elsewhere (Beals 2017). The 
reconciliations were regarded from the very beginning as 
part of a war strategy rather than a genuine desire to move 
toward power-sharing: promises pertaining to 
administrative decentralization and the special privileges 
promised to notables of reconciled areas were reversed over 
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time and loyalists were systematically reintroduced into 
these areas.  
 Moreover, as the power balance shifted its way, the 
regime’s determination to bring all Syrian territory back 
under its rule has been renewed. Regime media boasts that 
until recently the idea of a military victory was regarded as 
impossible to achieve but is no longer so and a return to a 
centralised government will be achieved (over time); only 
when it comes to the Kurdish areas does the regime exhibit 
uncertainty regarding the extent to which it can restore the 
old status quo. In private, regime connected figures admit the 
regime is reconciled to a continuing long struggle. Having 
achieved the upper hand on the ground at great cost, Asad 
has no interest in the concessions needed for a negotiated 
political transition.   
 Certainly, the opposition sees the regime’s 
reconciliation strategy as far from benign. Reconciliation 
deals do not amount to “reconciliation” but are either 
surrenders or temporary truces of convenience. In its most 
alarmist version, they are nothing less a plan for demographic 
re-engineering of Syria. Riyad Hassan Agha, of the Syrian 
opposition's Higher Negotiation Committee (HNC), sees it in 
these terms: make 12 million Syrians (predominantly Sunni) 
become displaced or refugees and force the remaining Sunnis 
of Damascus and the coast to accept their reduced role as a 
wounded minority which must show full allegiance. In 
parallel Iranian backed militias are introduced into areas 
where Sunni fighters depart as a strategy of Shia-ization 
(All4Syria Archive, http://www.all4syria.info/Archive/355010). 
 
“Reconciliation” in Action: Processes and Outcome 
Variations 
We can get a better idea of both government intentions and 
the constraints it faces by surveying the processes by which 
reconciliation deals have been reached and what their 
outcome has been. 
The negotiators for the government were army and 
intelligence officers as well as pro-regime residents of 
contested areas such as tribal or religious leaders, while the 
opposition side included fighters, council activists, religious 
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leaders and notables. The regime could not simply dictate the 
terms: e.g. pro-Asad notables with roots in East Ghouta made 
repeated negotiating trips to Islam Army-held Douma (Lund 
2017a). Negotiations often broke down because the 
government insisted on surrender or if less was demanded, 
spoilers, those profiting from checkpoints on both sides, but 
especially the hard-line local regime militias grouped in the 
National Defence Force (NDF) sometimes defied deals 
reached by government officials. In one instance, a 
reconciliation committee authorized by the government was 
killed by an Alawite militia. Bad faith and non-
implementation especially by the government deterred 
further agreements. Opposition groups might prolong the 
fighting to keep access to outside funding. When fighters 
were foreign or had no stake in the affected area, they were 
less responsive to civilian suffering and demands to end the 
fighting (Turkmani and Kaldor 2014). In 2016, the Russians 
set up their own Centre for reconciliation that claimed to 
broker 1479 truces, which, if true, marked a serious 
acceleration in their pace (Adleh and Favier 2017). 
 
Kinds of Agreements  
Kinds of agreement reflect not just the intentions of regime 
(and opposition) but the balance of power between them, and 
also factors such as whether a locale is strategic, its sectarian 
composition and the history of its role in the uprising.  
 
Type 1: The most unbalanced form of agreement leads to 
displacement of the entire population, (many of whom will 
have previously fled the area), perhaps in a population 
exchange such as occurred in the so-called four towns 
agreement wherein Shiite villages encircled by the 
opposition were evacuated in parallel to Sunni evacuations 
from the Kalamoun area, e.g. from Zebadani. This strategy, 
in opposition eyes, is based on forcing the inhabitants to 
relocate with a view towards creating demographic changes 
in a so-called “useful Syria.” (Ezzi 2017) 
In the case of Daraya, which was a platform for rebel 
attacks on regime-held Damascus and close to the Mezze 
military airport, not only was the population forced out, but 
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also regime troops looted and razed the town. By contrast, 
the neighbouring town of Moadamiyah, which had been 
more defensive in the conflict, was treated more generously. 
Many Daraya fighters went to Idlib, but others relocated to a 
new camp ten miles south of Damascus near Harjallah where 
new houses were built and free food, utilities, education and 
medical care were provided by the Red Crescent. Said one 
fighter: “We were given a choice. …when I came here, 
…everyone said the regime would take me to prison.” 
Evidently, this did not happen (Glass 2017). In some places, 
a Sunni-Alawite sectarian faultline influenced the regime's 
approach: Homs centre city and al-Waer, rebellious Sunni 
areas, both suffered population evacuation, shifting the 
demographic balance in favour of Alawites.  
 
Type 2: A somewhat less punitive deal required opposition 
fighters and activists to submit in return for lifting of sieges 
and restoring services but without large-scale population 
displacement. This version of ‘reconciliation’ was 
implemented in Qudsaya, Al-Hama, Al-Tal, Madaya, and the 
suburbs of eastern Damascus, among others. Anyone who 
was armed and did not accept government conditions was 
expelled. Submissive elements of the former armed 
opposition were absorbed into the regime’s local militias. 
The opposition’s local councils were dismantled since, 
offering an alternative to state institutions, they were seen as 
a threat to restoration of regime authority in rebel areas. 
Members of the reconciliation delegation, traditional 
dignitaries, merchants and clerics loyal to the official 
religious establishment become local leaders with temporary 
authority. Significantly, these deals allowed former Islamist 
clerics to be co-opted: e.g. in the town of Yalda in the 
southern Damascus countryside, the Imam of Masjid al-
Saliheen after having been a judge in a Sharia court of the 
Islamist factions, joined the government side as did the Imam 
of the Beit Sahem Great Mosque, who was the commander 
of Liwa Sham al-Rasoul’s Saraya al-Sham. Through the 
former Mufti of Rif Dimashq, Sheikh Muhammad Adnan 
Afiouni, a disciple of the late Shaikh Ahmad Kaftaru, the 
regime rehabilitated them and gave them guarantees that they 
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would not be prosecuted in return for their support for the 
policy of ‘reconciliation’. They were transformed into 
mediators between the people and the state. Although sieges 
were lifted in these cases, local humanitarian networks that 
had hitherto channelled aid from abroad were dismantled, as 
the government considered such delivery of aid to opposition 
areas a violation of its sovereignty. Now aid flowed only 
through government-affiliated channels where it might be 
diverted to loyalist hands or lost through corruption. The 
regime sometimes reneged on its promises to deliver 
services; in Al-Tal, electricity was not restored and there 
were arbitrary arrests by the pro-regime Qalamoun Shield 
militia.  The regime managed to co-opt some FSA fighters 
into its National Defence Forces, capitalizing on infighting 
and grievances between opposition groups. But in many 
‘reconciliation’ areas, the regime began imposing mandatory 
conscription (Adleh and Favier 2016; Ezzi 2017). 
 
Type 3: The third type of agreement was more balanced as 
dictated by a power balance between regime and opposition. 
Under this type of deal rebels maintained control of their 
areas in return for handing over heavy weaponry and halting 
attacks on regime forces; in return, sieges were lifted, return 
of the displaced and restoration of public utilities allowed 
(Hamlo 2015). The first agreement in Barzeh of June 2014 
was along these lines and much more favourable to the 
opposition than other deals owing to the fact that it was a 
strategic location the government needed to recover but had 
not been able to do so militarily, suffering many casualties; 
as such, it pushed for a ceasefire to neutralize this front. FSA 
fighters remained in control of their area, nominally 
transformed into a regime-sanctioned “popular army” 
charged with maintaining security, and the army pulled back 
to allow civilians to return, with the road to Damascus being 
opened (Turkmani and Kaldor 2014). Later, however in May 
2017, hundreds of rebels and their families were also 
evacuated after they decided to lay down their arms and leave 
to rebel-held Idlib province. 
 A similar deal was reached in 2014 in Jiroud, which 
thereafter remained peaceful. The deal was characterized by 
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an opposition activist as a “temporary truce” that served the 
interests of the opposing sides. The government wanted to 
reduce the number of fronts in which it is engaged and the 
(pro-opposition) inhabitants of Jiroud sought to spare their 
town. In his words, “The government will have to exercise 
self-restraint …because they cannot afford to reignite those 
fronts since the army is overstretched in such hotspots as 
Idlib, Daraa and Aleppo” (Hamlo 2015). 
 Al-Sanamayn in Daraa muhafazat was a model for 
how the regime sought to deal, at minimum cost, with the 
wider rebel-held south. It was strategic, being home to an 
important base of the Syrian army's 9th division and a 
gateway between Daraa and opposition areas of the Ghouta. 
Much of the town fell out of regime control and opposition 
local councils were set up, though most of the public services 
were still provided by the regime. The regime laid siege to 
the opposition-controlled neighbourhoods which was lifted 
under an agreement that the rebels would not attack regime 
positions or personnel. Some (not all) weapons were handed 
over but no fighters were compelled to leave. The regime's 
security forces did not intervene in security and criminal 
incidents in the town, allowing the armed factions to deal 
with these matters: if the regime arrested someone's relatives, 
that person would retaliate by kidnapping military personnel 
or firing on a military zone. With all clans armed for self-
defence, there was much lawlessness. Rather than 
conscription, the regime tried to recruit to the new Fifth Corp 
by offering substantial benefits. Facing manpower shortages, 
the regime saw this as a model for how to deal with the South; 
but it would not work in areas with a strong jihadi presence 
(Tamimi 2017).  
 
Type 4: A fourth type of agreement resulted where the 
opposition bargaining position rested on its control of a 
resource crucial to the government. In Wadi Barada, the truce 
stipulated that the government forces would not interfere in 
the town at all, in return for secure pumping of drinking water 
to Damascus from al-Fija spring; “The rebels cut off water 
supply to Damascus more than once, blackmailing the 
government until the latter agreed to their demands, which 
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were mostly about releasing prisoners from the regime’s 
jails,” Eventually, however, the government invaded and 
took over the Wadi area. Similarly, rebel groups seized 
control of gas pipelines in the town of Mahsa, which supplied 
power plants in Damascus, using it to extort money from the 
government or to win the release of prisoners. In Aleppo 
control of the city’s thermal power plant was the object of 
practical agreement between regime and opposition (Hamlo 
2015;. Turkmani and Kaldor 2014).  
  
Consequences of the Agreements 
Local reconciliation agreements have delivered humanitarian 
improvements and local peace that top down efforts failed to 
deliver. In the short term, Syrians accept them to get relief 
from war, but in the long term, obstacles to true 
reconciliation include government policies of forced 
conscription and displacement, loss of property of displaced, 
razing of informal settlements and lack of regime release of 
detainees (Adleh and Favier 2017).   
 Despite the regime’s expressed aim of restoring 
centralized rule over Syria, this is impractical in the medium 
term, and indeed, even in government controlled areas, 
power has become de-centralized to local strongmen, in a 
way not too different from the 3rd and 4th type of agreements 
with opposition areas. The last six years have created a 
culture of self-governance not only in areas that were outside 
of regime control, but even in areas like the coast and 
Damascus; a culture which the regime will have to adapt to. 
Indeed, it is in areas that remained under regime control that 
the regime will find it the most challenging to restore 
(assuming it actually desires to) to pre-uprising modes of 
governance. Millions of Syrians learned how to carry out 
their daily lives during periods when the government was far 
too preoccupied to deliver its previous services. These new 
survival skills often meant the rise of new organizations that 
the government tolerates because they are not politicized and 
are focused entirely on fulfilling functions that the 
government is too over stretched to carry out. 
 Local agreements need, however, to be incorporated 
into a comprehensive peace settlement; otherwise they will 
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be mere war tactics used to neutralize one area so fighting is 
easier elsewhere. (Turkmani) and will not deliver anything 
like reconciliation. Russian proposals seem to aim at just this 
and if they are realized would mean, in practice, a new more 
decentralized but also more lawless order for the medium 
term. As the situation stands today, the regime appears to 
have not only proven it can achieve a partial military victory, 
but also that the only type of changes it is willing to tolerate 
are those decentralized forms of governance that are taking 
place within the framework of reconciliations. These 
changes, however, insignificant as they may presently seem, 
strike at the very nature of pre-2011 Syria, and hence, 
ironically, what appears now as evidence of government 
triumph may eventually prove to be the foundation of a Syria 
not too different than that which the initial protests aspired to 
reach. 
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